Not Quite 10 Years Ago...

It's not quite ten years since I started this blog with this post. It was on April 22, 2008, and I should probably do the 10th anniversary post next month, but...it's snowing like mad out there right now, and I'm not going to be able to go do brewery visits like I planned, so I'm doing it now. What's a month?

Ten years ago things were pretty bad; they were worse than they are today. The State Stores were not under any kind of real scrutiny, they didn't have a useful website, and there hadn't been a serious push for privatization in 20 years. Beer was sold at distributors -- by the case and keg only -- or at taverns -- only 2 sixers at a time, and at a stiff markup -- and that was it...except for the occasional weird exception. The Legislature was in a long period of inactivity on the Almighty Liquor Code. And I was losing my mind after seeing how booze was sold all over the country.

So I started this blog...and things changed. I don't take any credit for this. Much like the success of my other crusade, the Session Beer Project, I don't feel that I caused any change. I just had a very sensitive ear to the ground, and caught the rumors and mumblings before almost anyone else did. At the most, I may have suggested lines of inquiry to reporters (who picked up on the blog fairly early; as did a suspicious number of IP addresses in downtown Harrisburg), and if that worked, well, that's always been the main aim and hoped-for audience of the blog. (A big hat-tip and thanks to my co-writer, the pseudonymous Albert Brooks, who picked up the pen while I was sidelined for over two years and has done a GREAT job feeding facts to that audience.)

What happened in the past ten years? Here's the dumb stuff.

• The PLCB spent $3.6 million on public image, advertising, and store layout, paid to a California-based marketing firm. They come up with a new name for the State Stores: "Table Leaf." In a rare rush of smarts, the PLCB realized that's idiotic (though they did keep an option on it; see below), and decided to go with the basic stupid rename: Fine Wine and Good Spirits Store. Governor Rendell was furious...and the PLCB blatantly didn't care. Your money wasted: it's a monopoly (a police-enforced monopoly, as we would point out many times), there's no need for marketing.
• The aptly-named Special Liquor Order (and they call it SLO, you can't make this up) system broke down again, and again, and again...
• The PLCB so badly screwed up their new inventory system in 2011 that store managers over-ordered so much wine that they had to store almost 100,000 cases of it in tractor-trailers...un-air conditioned trailers, in the summer. Renting the trailers and hiring security guards cost about $500,000. (Numbers are from an Auditor General report.) Good job, morons!
• Around 20 State Stores closed. A bunch more were moved for arbitrary reasons without input from local communities. And of course, we revealed that ten counties in Pennsylvania have only ONE State Store. There are ten others with only two.
• The Courtesy Contract. The PLCB spent $173,820 on training State Store System clerks "how to greet someone, where to stand, and how to read a customer's cues." And the company doing the training belonged to a PLCB regional manager's spouse. Real nice. 
• We saw several ethics investigations of the PLCB (one of which struck paydirt) and several harshly worded audits. The marketing director was found guilty of fraud...back in 2015, and he still has not been sentenced. Speculation is that he is cooperating in further federal investigations. Conti must be spooked. 
• We saw again and again that the PLCB often actively made it harder for licensees and wholesalers and brewers to sell beer. You know...their only competition in the booze biz. Not bad, when you make the rules. This included the harassment of three Philly bars and a major Philly beer wholesaler for selling "unregistered" beer, carried out by the BLCE and supported by the PLCB (and their soon-to-be-exposed flawed database). After armed raids, seizures of beer, disruption of private (beer) business, and a full-blown legislative hearing...the result was a warning letter. Harassment, and they should have been sued. 
• The Saga of Joe "Da CEO" Conti, from his disappearance, to his greatest failure, to his ignominious end, to his unlikely (and lucrative) return. We miss his shenanigans; his constantly wrong-footed instincts were the best thing that ever happened to privatization. 
• The Wine Kiosks. Nothing more need be said. Possibly their biggest failure in the last 40 years, and that's saying something. 
• Table Leaf: the brand. As mentioned above, they'd already (over)paid for this branding, so they used it for a house brand of wine. And then they decided to wield it as a weapon against their biggest suppliers...and Pennsylvania wineries. Who brought it to the Legislature's attention, and that was the end of another PLCB fiasco.
• Privatization was repeatedly brought up by the House, and squashed in the Senate, mainly thanks to the efforts of Senator Chuck McIlhinney.
• But in all the past ten years, the very worst thing that happened was that the Legislature let the PLCB have the one thing that they never should have: so-called "flexible pricing." This is the idea that the PLCB should not be forced to use the same set mark-up on every item; when they got a deal, they could pass it on (which is bullshit: they could always have done that). What it really means is that they charge more; we told you that for years, and golly, it was true. We're stuck with it, too.

  

  Ah, the wine kiosk. The Best Worst Thing.

Wow. I know I'm missing stuff, but those are the big ones. Yet somehow, these ding-dongs are still in business, still the sole wholesaler of wine and spirits in the state despite continual screw-ups.

Meanwhile, we did get some things, although almost all of them were mixed blessings. 

All right, break it up!

• The case law is finally gone! That was one of the big ones. We no longer have to buy an entire case of beer at the distributor. That'd be great, except we still can only buy a 12-pack at bars and grocery stores (more on that shortly), then walk out the door and walk back in and buy another...What kind of bullshit is that?
• We can buy beer and wine in grocery stores and convenience stores!! HOT DAMN! Whoa there, hoss. We can buy beer and wine in places that hold a restaurant license; that's always been true, but now these stores can buy those licenses (for as much as $500,000!), and put in a 'cafe' that seats at least 30, and sell sixpacks. About 450-odd stores have done so, out of the thousands in the state. So don't wet yourself with glee. And remember: a 12-pack of beer, or four bottles of wine, and it's out the door you go. 
• Direct wine shipment (and beer...but not liquor) is now a thing. That's a big deal for a small number of people. 
• The PLCB had to start telling the truth about their financials; specifically, their deep pension debt. And just like that, they were no longer making money, net of taxes. They still are paying money into the General Fund, because they have to, but they're doing it out of reserve assets. The day of reckoning is coming. 
• We got some really cool stuff: Pennsylvania booze producers can cross-sell their products. A winery can sell PA-produced beer, cider, spirits, mead...and, what, kvass, I guess? Any of that. And they can have satellite stores off their main production premises, which can also sell those other products, which has led to Pennsylvania Libations, the first privately-owned liquor store in Pennsylvania in almost 100 years. And that's cool. 
• About a thousand (I think) liquor licenses were blown out of escrow and auctioned off. Mostly picked up by grocery stores. So that's kind of good, but...all those grocery stores buying bar licenses is making the price of a license go up, a lot in some places, and that's putting the squeeze on indie mom-and-pop bars and groceries. This is going to give us a lot more chain groceries and chain restaurants, and that, my friends, ain't optimal. 

That's all I can think of right now. There have been some other side effects. One, the PLCB is running scared, and the selection is about as good as it's been in a while. (You're a fool if you think that will continue if the privatization talk dies down, so let's keep 'em scared.) Two, the BLCE has been scared to do any enforcement of the monopoly, so we can buy out of state with impunity. Three, people have a lower opinion of the PLCB these days after the corruption charges, and that's good. Four, McIlhinney's retiring, and maybe we can get someone who really gets it in there.

OTOH...The GOP has, overall, been a huge friend to privatization of the PLCB in the past 40 years, despite numerous missteps. The unpopularity of the Trump administration may lead to a loss of the solid GOP majority in the General Assembly. Overall, that's how things go, but for this issue? If the Democrats gain a majority, or cut the GOP majority, you can kiss further progress good-bye. Because the Dems have made it crystal-clear that they are opposed to any further privatization of the State Store System. We'll just have to wait and see.

Overall, though? Good progress at the 10-year mark. We got rid of the case law, and the PLCB's sales are suffering from the wine sales at groceries. This is what union boss Wendell W. "Windy Wendy" Young IV referred to as "the death of a thousand cuts." Here's hoping he's right about that, and that "flexible pricing" doesn't bleed us to death in the meantime.

I feel for you folks who are far from a border. If Philly were where State College is, away from the liquor stores of Jersey and Delaware, the PLCB would have been long gone. Let's keep the pressure on.

Big PLCB Price Hike May Be Coming!

The PLCB is playing hardball with their suppliers, and it looks like part of the process is threats in the media. Check this out from a recent story at KDKA's CBS Pittsburgh site titled "Prices Of Best-Selling Wines & Spirits To Rise."

The PLCB’s Elizabeth Brassell says the suppliers have been told the price for their product is going to go up on the shelf, “unless our suppliers of those products offer us lower acquisition cost to avoid the retail price increases.”
Brassell says the price increases affect “the best-selling 150 brands of spirits and best-selling 150 brands of wine.” In other words, probably your favorites.

You know what we have to say about that, right? Welcome to Flexible Pricing...we told you so! You know why it's going to affect the 150 best sellers? Because those are the only PLCB products covered by Flexible Pricing! Everything else is still under the mandated markup. 

Here's what the PLCB thinks is going to happen. The PLCB is going to hammer the producers in negotiations! They'll balk at lowering prices, because they know the PLCB isn't going to lower the price on the shelf (because they promised to make a LOT off of this), the PLCB will make this childish "don't make us raise prices!" bid in the press, figuring the producers will lower prices, and then they can say "look, your prices stayed the same, we are HEROES!!" while sucking off all the difference to cover their spiraling operating costs and hold off privatization for another legislative cycle...and the producers will call their bluff, and give 'em nothing.

And the PLCB will just have to raise prices and look like the inexperienced amateurs they are, we'll get screwed, border bleed will explode, and maybe, maybe we'll finally tell our representatives to get rid of this moldy old piece of Prohibitionist crap.

The PLCB Act .39 Special, only one made.

And here's the beauty of it all. If I were the producers... I'd be saying "Screw them. Jack the prices, blame it on them, and maybe Pennsylvania will finally wake up and get rid of these idiots. This is our chance!" Run the long game, booze folks, run the long game, and help us dump these rubes.

Because you know what I'm going to do when the prices go up at the end of August? Hop in the car and go buy booze in Delaware. Why not come along? Let's dump these rubes!

4 for 25. Pitiful isn't it? Want the best wine - shop out of state.(corrected)

Rejoice Citizens! Out of 101,000 cases for the Wine Spectators top 25 wines your PLCB managed to secure about 10 of them! 

In a stunning display of wine buying ineptitude those highly qualified, knowledgeable (so we're told) buyers responsible for satisfying the wants of almost 13 million citizens of the Commonwealth managed to select even fewer of the Wine Spectator top 25 wines this year than last. With numerous private stores across the country doing as well or better one has to wonder how they do it with such limited buying power and no PLCB experts on hand to help them.

This yet again proves that to be a savvy wine consumer in Pennsylvania one only has to travel out of state


Without further ado, Wine Spectator's #11-25.

11. Mt. Eden Vineyards Chardonnay Santa Cruz Mountains 2011, 1,692 cases.  
      Not available in PA
12. Château Guiraud Sauternes 2011, 7,000 cases.
      Not available in PA
13. Fonseca Vintage Port 2011, 2,190 cases.
      I originally listed this as Not available in PA but if you search for porto instead of port it shows up.  My bad.
14. Fontodi Colli della Toscana Centrale Flaccianello 2011, 4,000 cases.
      Not available in PA
15. Bedrock The Bedrock Heritage Sonoma Valley 2012, 500 cases.
      Not available in PA
16. Two Hands Shiraz Barossa Valley Bella's Garden 2012, 6,000 cases. 
      Not available in PA
17. Soter Pinot Noir Yamhill-Carlton District Mineral Springs Ranch 2012, 1,500 cases.  
      Not available in PA
18. Château Doisy-Védrines Barsac 2011, 3,500 cases.
      Not available in PA
19. Luca Malbec Uco Valley 2012, 7,000 cases.
      Not available in PA
20. Peter Michael Chardonnay Knights Valley Ma Belle-Fille, 2,080 cases
      Not available in PA
21. Castello di Volpaia Chianti Classico Riserva 2010, 4,000 cases.  
      Not available in PA
22. Podere Sapaio Bolgheri Volpolo 2011, 7,500 cases.  
      Not available in PA


23. St.-Cosme Châteauneuf-du-Pape 2010, 1,300 cases. Hey, we've got some! There were 4 bottles left in the entire state Monday morning. Better hurry...because you know the clerks won't hold them.


24. Massolino Barolo 2009, 3,165 cases.  
      Not available in PA
25. Bodegas y Viñedos O. Fournier Malbec Uco Valley Alfa Crux 2010, 1,250 cases.
      Not available in PA

The PLCB annual report - Let's look at some numbers

By all accounts, the PLCB had a good sales year. Well, hurray. It's nothing to brag about -- though they will, and have -- since they are the only game in town. The population grows (slowly, but it grows), the economy gets better, and people spend more money on booze. It isn't because the PLCB is doing a good job; it is because the citizens have no other choice.

PLCB touts "record sales": report shows net income down

That doesn't stop the PLCB from presenting their annual report as if they had something to do with the growth in sales. Here are some things they crow about in the report:

1. License fees returned to local municipalities $ 4,521,545 -- If the PLCB didn't get in the middle, local communities would get this revenue as a regular stream when businesses paid for their licenses TO THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES.

2. Philadelphia and Allegheny counties received $8,269,803 in returned local sales taxes. -- Again, if the PLCB wasn't in the middle, the taxes would be collected and distributed anyway. It must be nice to crow about following the law...except, of course, when it comes to trips and gifts for senior level PLCB employees.

3. Paid Total Annual Rent of $42,034,434 for 606 stores. -- This begs the question of how much rent would be paid if there were 2400 or so private stores? 2400 stores is about what the national average is for a population of almost 13 million.

4. Tweets sent: 723. -- Now this is pretty funny. A $2 billion enterprise managed to send out fewer tweets than my 16 year old niece does in a month. And then they go on to say that the PLCB was mentioned 2,516 times. This post counts as one of those mentions, just as an example, and so does this: "Hey @WolfForPA, can you do something about the PA Liquor Control Board, like get rid of it? ‪#‎priorities‬ ‪#‎wine‬ ‪#‎freedom‬" (tweeted by @mainlinehousewife on Nov. 4)

5. Updated the Fine Wine and Good Spirits eCommerce site with 'complete and accurate product names,' product descriptions and standardized acronyms. -- Really? From the people who completely cocked up the beer registration list just a few years ago? Let's look at just a couple easily-found examples.

George Dickel Tennessee Whiskey. The No. 8 brand is listed in the bourbon section and the No. 12 brand is listed in the Whiskey section

Jack Daniel's Tennessee Whiskey has one listed in the bourbon section "Jack Daniel's 1St Edition Straight Bourbon Master Distiller Collection" Which only exists in the mind of some PLCB employee since Jack Daniel doesn't label ANY of its whiskeys as "bourbon." Not one. All the others are listed in the Whiskey section as they should be, except for one that is in the Blended Whiskey section; but Jack doesn't do blended whiskey either. I will give them credit though: it only took them 80 years to finally learn how to spell "Jack Daniel's" correctly. I pointed out mistakes on that as recently as this past spring.

6. Also restructured the website search engine to allow searches using misspelled words, abbreviations, and synonyms producing much improved search results for customers. -- Let's see how that works.  Sticking with Jack Daniel's type in Jack Danial's into the search box.  You only misspelled it by one letter putting an "a" instead of an "e" in Danial's. The result.....a page and a half of Calico Jack rum first, but JD does show up on page 2.  

How about we just forget the "'s" and put in Jack Daniel into the search box.  Again a page and a half of Calico Jack rum and then the JD on page 2. An improvement! ...until you realize that if you spell Jack Daniel's correctly and search for it, you still get a page and a half of Calico Jack rum first! The trick, apparently, is to just put in Daniel's, and you'll get all the JD  listings. Just don't misspell it or forget the "s" or the apostrophe, because then you get nothing contrary to what the PLCB says. Not quite ready for prime time and certainly not a product a $2 billion company should be proud of.

I can find a lot more but let's look at some money.

Sales on the captive Pennsylvania population did go up 3.2%, which is to be expected, given that the state has a monopoly and overall spirits and wine sales were up nationally. But Gross Profit only went up 3%...and Net Income (which in a 'real' business would be called 'Profit') went down by 3.6%! Wondering why? Here's a clue: operating expenses went up 5.2% (which is a lot, considering what it bought them, as we'll see in a bit). Operating income went down, even though the much-ballyhooed 'bailment' is in effect (where the PLCB doesn't pay for a product until it leaves the warehouse). Contributions to the BLCE went up 4.1 %, but BLCE enforcement of border bleed is at the lowest it has ever been. Oddly, during this record alcohol sales year, the amount that went to Drug and Alcohol programs went down 3.6%, which seems a little contradictory, given the 'control' mission of the PLCB.
 
Don't overlook another big one: Return on Assets (usually called Return on Investment) went down 14.8%! ROA gives an idea as to how efficient management is at using its assets to generate earnings. Also, even though there was only 1 more store than last year, wages as a percent of sales increased an astounding 18.3%, which is not a good indicator of efficiency either.

Of course, a real business has to list all their debts on their reports to shareholders...and I don't see the over $600 million that is the PLCB share of the pension debt listed anywhere. Maybe it doesn't count since the taxpayers and not the PLCB have to cover it. 

Like any business with a PR department, the PLCB tries to put on its happy face when reporting on what a super duper job they are doing, but the end result is still less selection, less convenience, higher prices, no real increase in safety, and certainly more aggravation for the consumer than in states with a privately-run liquor retail and wholesale industry. One only has to travel to see that for yourself.

Still more fun with PLCB numbers - Update

Keeping up their streak, the PLCB is still giving discounts to those who drink the higher end items and shafting those who don't.  From the July meeting agenda.

See if you can find your own.

Item - Unit Cost - Retail Cost - Page# - What it should cost


Johnnie Walker Blue with glasses in Refgid Box
$166.41  $234.99   8        $255.27

Casanova Di Neri Brunello di Montalcino "Cerretalto" DOCG
$184.56    $258.99    35    $283.12

Casanova Di Neri Brunello di Montalcino "Tenuta Nuova" DOCG
$66.10    $72.99    35    $101.40

Cain Vineyards Five
$101.36    $149.99    39    $155.49

Jameson Rarest Vintage Reserve Irish Whisky
$221.94    $309.99    39    $340.46

Glenrothes 1978 Vintage Single Malt Scotch
$643.08    $849.99    40    $986.48

Glendronach 21YO Parliament Single Malt Scotch
$100.53    $124.99    40    $154.21

Retail price should be unit cost times the markup (30%) times the flood tax (18%), 

$X * 1.3 *1.18 = Retail Cost

Still more fun with PLCB numbers

Today we are going to look at some disparities in the PLCB mark-up.  Part of the so called "modernization" is to have variable pricing, where the PLCB would raise the price (change the mark-up) of Captain Morgan a quarter so they could lower the price of Johnnie Walker Blue, for example.

But first a little history. Remember the PLCB was tasked to come up with a variable pricing plan in 1985 (within the Liquor Code). They did, but it was never implemented according to the Legislative Finance and Budget Committee Performance Audit of  May1992. However, it seems that there is already a variable mark-up in use. Looking at the June PLCB meeting minutes on page 27 you'll see Chateau D'yquem Sauternes for a unit cost of $681.05 and a retail cost of $909.99. Now to get from unit cost to retail you have to add on the 30% PLCB mark-up and the 18% JFT. There are some minor things like roundup and bottle fees that might add a few dollars too.

So we have:  $681.05 X 1.30 = $885.36 which is the markup.
Now impose the Johnstown Flood Tax:
$885.36 X 1.18 = $1044.73

But $1044.73 is not $909.99! So who gets shorted? The State or the PLCB? If the PLCB gets shorted, then the markup is only 13%. If the state is being shorted, then they are only getting 2.5% of their Johnstown Flood Tax, and not 18%.

I'd like to hear that explanation. Is the PLCB just arbitrarily changing mark-up so their prices are somewhat within range of normal and not so high as to be laughable? If they are, then why does that have to be "modernized," since they are already doing it? I find it interesting and this is not the only one - just the most glaring.

Another from the same meeting on page 29: Chateau de Beaucastel has a unit cost of $383.71 and a retail price of $519.99; again the math doesn't match.

$383.71 X 1.30 = $498.82
$498.82 X 1.18 = $588.61
But $588.61 is not $519.99

There are more, and you can do the math yourselves.
Balvenie 17 Year Old Doublewood page 19
Meteor Vineyard "Perseid" page 30
Dos Armadillos Tequila Extra Anejo page 32

Clean-up on Aisle Math!

I can find examples in other board meeting minutes, in fact, every one I've looked at (although I haven't looked at all of them nor every item). So what is going on here? A Union representative said it was probably a reporting error, which, if true, would explain it all away, but then bring up the question of why are there so many and why is it only on high priced items? Why don't regular items have as many reporting errors? I've gone through a pretty good number of them and you are welcome to try too...but so far it is only higher end items.

Even more proof is the infamous Screaming Eagle Wine debacle when the PLCB not only didn't pay the Flood Tax, make any mark-up at all and lost over $7,000 on the original unit cost of 10 bottles. I didn't see any legislative action approving that. That seems pretty variable to me going from 30% to -25% and not collecting or paying any taxes.

Does this mean the PLCB is somehow giving a break to people who can afford $900 bottles of wine while shafting the average citizen? Sure looks that way but if any representative of the PLCB wants to offer an explanation, I'll post it. I know that the Office of the Chief Council of the PLCB reads this since she has searched me out, so c'mon Faith you or your minions pass this along to somebody who can answer it.

More fun with PLCB numbers

Remember that the PLCB say that they only have a 30% markup and that no private business could survive paying a wholesaler and selling a product at a profit for that amount. Prices will go up, they say, because there's no way they can sell you booze as cheap as the PLCB! They actually say that.

Well...like a number of things they say, it's true only on the surface. If you look at the agency's Income Statement for June 2012 to June 2013 you will see that Sales net of taxes is $1,731,463,014, while cost of goods sold is $1,192,047,304...which indicates a profit margin of 45.2%. All sorts of businesses can operate on a 45% margin. So how does the PLCB get from 30% to over 45%?  They have bottle fees, bailment fees, "rounding," and probably some miscellaneous stuff we don't know about. Do the bottle fees and rounding account for an additional 15 percent of PLCB  markup?

According to the PLCB itself, it does. This quote is from PLCB Consumer Relations in an email they sent me. "According to our Bureau of Financial Operations, apart from some other minor influences, the bottle fee and rounding do account for the approximate percentage you note of gross revenue on a yearly basis."

Let's look at the last board meeting from April 2 to get an idea about how quickly the price can jump once the PLCB gets hold of a bottle. We'll start with these:

Item..............................................Unit cost...Sale Price..Markup
Shoofly Chardonnay                      $6.05       $10.99      81.6%
Woop Woop Chardonnay               $6.10       $10.99      80.1%
Sassello Morellino di Scanzano      $6.12       $11.99      95.9%
Camara Alta Tempranillo Navarra    $6.33       $11.49      81.5%
Domaine du Chapitre Touraine Blanc $6.47       $11.99      85.3%
Wine By Joe Pinot Gris                    $6.55       $11.99      83%
Chateau Ste. Michelle Dry Riesling   $6.75       $11.99      77.6%
Chasseur Des Brousses                   $6.87       $12.99      89.1%
(Markup for this list is total markup with 18% JFT)

As you can see, a few cents difference -- with the 30% markup + the bottle fee + "rounding" -- can equal a large amount of change in what the PLCB charges the consumer and what their real total markup is.

And think about it. What this means is that even with a 45% total markup the PLCB can't afford to have as many stores as they did 20 years ago, let alone the 750+ they had in the 1970's.  They can't afford to hire and maintain workers at the highest end of retail and still provide the service they are required to provide. Even with a police-enforced monopoly, their business model doesn't work anywhere near as well as the private sector.

Life in Pennsylvania: where the police will tell you what legal products you can buy and where you can buy them...and if you try to buy them somewhere else...they'll arrest you. 

WE DESERVE BETTER - PRIVATIZE!


Yes, the picture is fake but the verbiage isn't. Duh. It's what we call a parody, or exaggeration, a photographic catroon. The difference is, unlike everything Wendell W. Young IV says about the PLCB, we admit that it is bullshit.

Privatization facts & figures

All the arguments against privatization — job losses, revenue losses, public safety endangered, less selection and higher prices, less convenience, and worse service — are addressed and refuted below, with facts and common sense. Arm yourselves with knowledge, and pass it on to your legislators.

Jobs - Everyplace in North America that has privatized some or all of their liquor distribution system has seen an increase in employment. Jobs in the industry tripled in Washington State and Alberta, Canada, the last two places that fully privatized. They doubled in Iowa, which kept wholesale sales but privatized all retail. Are the jobs exactly the same as what they replace? Probably not; are all jobs the same at every store where you shop now? Why would alcohol sales be any different?

Revenue and Border Bleed - Sales have gone up in privatized systems, every single one; how much is dependent on taxation more than anything else. Case in point is Washington State, which already had the highest liquor taxes in the country before they privatized and added new fees. Sales have still gone up in state, and the fee-driven increase in border bleed has increased sales out of state. If they hadn’t raised taxes, in-state sales would have increased even more. Washington State’s border bleed is nowhere near the border bleed rate in PA. The border bleed increase for an entire year in Washington is about a weeks worth of the border bleed PA sees.  While privatization will not eliminate border bleed in PA, it will, just from a convenience standpoint, decrease it. A privatized PA will still not be able to equal pricing of states with lower taxes, but it will make it easier to buy locally. People pay more for convenience all the time, even when less expensive alternatives exist reasonably close. Case in point is buying almost any food or dairy item in a convenience store — “a damn Sheetz,” as Senator Ferlo would snarl — instead of a grocery store. The key is to not raise taxes.

Revenue 2 – Iowa actually decreased their taxation and still reported making more than they would have if they kept their state stores.

Revenue 3 - It isn’t only direct liquor taxation that has to be taken into account. For PA, there will be business taxes that the current system doesn’t pay. There will be more income taxes from owners and workers, since there will be more of each. There will be new jobs created that do not exist under our current system, delivery to bars and restaurants being one example, and increases in current jobs to accommodate new business. Again, just one new warehouse in Washington State employed 1,100 workers, which was more than the entire state store workforce of 937. In the long term, money will be saved by not having taxpayers responsible for future retirement and medical shortfalls. The current amount the taxpayers owe for PLCB pensions is $550 million and is expected to go up to $600 million by the end of this year.

Safety – Under the current system PA has more DUIs, DUI fatalities, underage DUI, binge drinking and underage binge drinking than 4 of the 5 privately run states on our border, and is just average compared to the rest of the country. Washington State has seen an 8% reduction in DUI crashes and DUI fatalities since privatization. While some may claim that is because there was less policing, policing has no effect on the decrease in DUI fatalities. Alberta, Canada has decreased their DUI fatality rate to one of the lowest on the continent (37% lower than PA) since they privatized, even though they have over 1,300 retail liquor outlets now for a population of under 4 million. Is there a connection? No way to say without further study, but it’s plain to see that privatization didn’t make the situation worse.

Safety 2 – Limiting underage access has always been a point for those opposed to privatization. While the true rate of underage purchases in PA State Stores is not known, since they are never independently checked (or policed in undercover sting operations, as privately-owned liquor stores in other states are) it would follow that it should be about the same as other localities which have similar requirements. Washington State was at approximately 93-94% compliance before privatization and is at about 92% now. Another thing we can learn from Washington State’s experience is how to limit direct unobstructed egress to cut down on shoplifting.

Selection - Under the PLCB, urban areas essentially subsidize rural areas for alcohol selection, something that would seem to go against their stated mission of limiting access. This is the retail equivalent of PENNDOT making sure there is a Jaguar dealer in every county, because without government intervention they wouldn’t be there. Where the population can support them there will be larger stores, and in areas that can’t support those, there will be smaller stores. This is the retail model found almost everywhere. It is not the government’s job to make sure you can buy a wide selection of booze, especially when they say it’s detrimental (but they still want to sell you more of it). It is their job to make sure that a business climate exists which will allow retailers to try to sell whatever they want within the regulations and restrictions. To date I have not heard a reasonable explanation as to why the state should subsidize alcohol like they do milk.

Selection 2 - That in-store selection will increase is not in question. One only need to look across the country to stores like Bev-Mo, Total Wine, Roger Wilco, Binny’s, HighTime, B-21 and hundreds of others to see what the private sector can provide. They provide it based on consumer demand, not by what a bureaucrat or committee with unknown or non-existent credentials selects for them in a small capital city, far from major markets. What is in question is what variety will be available in rural areas. The answer is the same as it is for any other product. If the demand is there, the market will provide it, just as it does in rural grocery stores and hardware stores. If what you want is not available locally, chances are you will be able to order it, the same as now, only you probably won’t have to buy a case at a time as it is with a good portion of the current system. The entire state of big, small, specialty, urban, and rural stores will be open to you. Not that every store will ship but it will certainly be more than now, because real businesses strive for customer service since their existence depends on it and not state police enforced monopoly power.

Prices – There are no absolutes in pricing. So much would depend on the system that is selected. Do we continue with the three tier system or do we eliminate one tier and allow more direct buying? Are taxes collected at the wholesale or retail level? Will the taxes increase or remain the same? Depending on what combination is used, you can say that prices should go down or prices should go up. The one thing you can say with certainty is that in a competitive market prices are lower than they would be given the same circumstances in a non-competitive market. As the third largest retail buyer on the continent one would expect the State Stores to have some of the best pricing available in the country. However, this is not always the case and the differences are more than taxes alone can account for.

Convenience – Since closing 20% of their stores in the past 40 years and having the lowest amount of stores per capita in the country (even lower than Utah!) there is no doubt the current system is inconvenient. Quite simply, anything that doesn’t open hundreds, if not a couple thousand more locations will not provide convenience seen in other states, and is a Band-Aid at best. It is obvious the PLCB cannot begin to compete in this area because they can’t afford it based on their business model of having everything the same store everywhere. Don’t let them buffalo you: the PLCB chooses the number of stores to open, not the legislature; the number of stores is not enforced by the Almighty Liquor Code (with the exception of the number of stores allowed to be open on Sunday). So while the population has increased over the last four decades, the number of State Stores has decreased from over 750 to about 605 today. Just to reach the national average, Pennsylvania should have about four times that number. “Modernization” does not begin to answer that issue, with one proposal saying they want to put 400 sq. ft. “stores” inside other stores, which they are already allowed to do now, and have been for at least 30 years. What exactly does that do for the consumer that the same size private store (which they claim wouldn’t provide the selection) would, besides remove that business opportunity from the citizenry?

Service – Unlike other retail stores, if you don’t like the service you can’t go anywhere else. You are stuck with the same training, the same attitudes, the same level of passion. In the world of private stores, if you don’t like the service you can go somewhere else and reward them with your business. The stores with bad service will eventually fail, and if somebody else sees the opportunity another will open. In the private sector you will find stores with a sales staff of well-trained professionals along with stores whose sales staff can barely tie their shoes. You have the choice of what level you require. Same size fits all is not a tenet of retail, although it seems to be gospel for the PLCB. There are private stores who have sommeliers on staff. The whole of the PLCB, 600 retail stores and an entire state’s wholesale wine trade, doesn’t. To be fair, the PLCB does have a sommelier as a part-time consultant. One. Part time. For the entire state. The third largest retail wine buyer on the continent does not have a full-time top tier wine person. I can’t be the only one to think there is something wrong with the system that not only allows this, but doesn’t care.

Privatization does create winners and losers. The winners are the citizens who now have access to a free market; the losers are those who can’t adapt to the free market system. While no system is perfect, looking at the rest of the country it is easy to see which one is preferred by consumers and businesses whenever there is a choice.

TELL YOUR LEGISLATORS YOU WANT THAT CHOICE!